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I II T R 0 D U C T i o n 
Political process is concerned T'ith v)ho nets 
what, v'hen an' hov\ Pec-use o'' ff^e scnrcit^i o ' socia" 
resources th-^ socia'^ s^s^'Vi has ncv^r been a'i~e to 
satisfy the de^'rinds o-^ -zli nc-^'hers o " the societv to 
their satisfaction, '^oriscriienilu, conflict over ike 
scare social values onr' •'-csourccr ir thn inevitable 
result, Pover is then usee'' to exercise various forns of 
influence 'o get nhrt one wants. In this may, .'fachten-
faltung (the ahilitv to shOTi an^ exercise poroerj is a 
natural corollary o •" this process. 
Violence is a continuation of this bargatninp process 
hut hu dif ^erent -'e-'us. It is a very rational technique 
though it ~iai' be use" hn unreasonable men. The ne^d for 
violence is ^^li'avs nresent in a societxi pregnant vi'h 
tensions r*^ "'in' >o • ro'-^ial scarcity. Only Ike -"park 1r 
nocdc' an 'vooi'^ed. ^ho provides the spark drtnr-^nnes tlie 
utfitv 0 " v' o'' one '. Put the n^tu.re an'^ need o " violence 
ma' be c^v^ ained in tcrn.s o '' social bargaining, "'here violence 
4 
becop.es a continuarion of the political process and is a tool, 
a -letho'' a^-.--^ a technigue to achieve the desired objectives. 
The present ^l^td^' is an attempt to analyse the typologv, 
sources and nature o ' violence in this theoretical paradig^n. 
Conce-ntvaJ ^r^^~ «' ork has ^^ern advanced that whatever be the 
Chapter - I 
POLITICAL STRUGGLE AIW HEED "^OR VIOLENCE 
"All politics is a struaale for pover; the ultinate 
1 
kind of povwr is violence", saj.'s C. Wright 'Hlls, alnost 
echoeing 'fax Weber's classic definition of the state as 
"the rule of men over men based on the me"ns of lepitinate, 
2 
that is, allegedly leoiiinate, violence" . Politics is, 
actually, the studj' of v^ho gets rihot, vhen and hov\ Political 
process is, thus, concerned nith the distribution of social 
values. In cr.se o' ' an agreement on values, or on harmony a^iout 
the ends and T^eans, there vould he no need to change the beha-
viour of others.' Consequently, there would be no political 
system, in the a'''sence of influence pover relation. If, as 
according to Robert Dahl, the behaviour of others is sovrht to 
be changed hy "creatinn '-he erpectations of siseahl e rev-ards 
or deprivations", then relations o'^ gover co^'e into eristence. 
Because perfect harmony among individuals is not possihle, 
political system involving relations of influence and power 
results. 
In the roliticd process, porter sinnifies thp capacity 
to regulate the behaviou.r of others towards particular objec-
tives. It is tho process o " regulating the behaviour of others 
1. .'fills, C. '""right The Porter Elite. 
2. Ueber, 'fax. "The Pover ^^lite'/ 1956, p. 171. 
3. Dahl, Robert A. ."or'cm Political Anali/sis, p. 12. 
4. Lasswell, Herald >'!- Kaplan /'orton. "Power an'' Societji, p,75. 
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by the threat of value-deprivations in case of non-conforpitu 
with the behaviour souaht. It is the abilitu to rentraip, 
transport, inrobilise, injire, destroy or direct human energy 
(that is, attitudes and behaviour) to realise values sovnhi 
by the nodi fication and control or rewards and depriva fions. 
In this, power is a neans, a technique for the achiev^nenf of 
ends other than po'wr. Pursuit of social values involves, 
therefore, a struanle for pover, and distribution of social 
values is the ^w^ction o "^  poll ticnl process. Thus, it nay be 
said that politics is the "shapina, d'istri" ution and exercise 
of power". Former is thus a phenomenon of group cohesion and 
aggregation, a function of social relations ofnen. ''^ItinatpJ v, 
this pover is vested in the state. As T/eber has described^a 
state is "a hunan con-^unity that (successfully) clains the 
mono-^oly of '^he 1 eniti^ate use o'^ phusic^l force rifhin a niven 
7 
territory. '^'hus, ac -^rding to ^r'ch Kaufnan^, the essence of 
the state is "'fac"->tenfaltung" which 19, develorment, increase 
and display of porter, coupled vithe the ability to success fullv 
dssert itself. 
Conflict is present in organised society and rontrolling' 
it is the control function of ^oliticnl processes. The socalled 
political arenc operates at the center of carefully regulated 
5, lleiberc, H.L. Politic-1 violence ; TEe behavioral Process . 
p. 10. 
6, Lasswell rn^ \aplan, Ihid, p. 75. 
7. .'fills, C. ^richt rn' C-erth, 7. "'Yon "gr, Weber. ,-Essaj/s in 
Sociology". 
8. Precht, Ar'zolf\ Political Theory . p, 345» 
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struggle wit' in a shi-^tinn, hut generally agreed upon, set 
of rules suls- itutinr competition for conHict, ffach md 
Snyder have made a very useful distinction betv^een compe-
tition and conflict, Conpetition involves strivino for 
scarce resources according to sets of ruTes governina the 
tactics to be us^d by co-^netitor, and total destruction of 
the opposition is not considered to he competition. Con''lict 
occurs when conpetitors disregard rules or rhen th"'i spek to 
destroy each other in their quest for scarce resources. In 
fact, political competition/conflict relationship is best 
visualised as a continuun ranging from competitive non-violent-/ 
destructive behc viour in confomity rith rules at one extrene 
to conflict-violent-dectructive behaviour tn violation o^ 
established nor^.s at the other, vith much of the intervening 
behaviour being neither clearly competition nor clenrli/ 
confl ict. 
non-
Por-er ir the tool both for conretition and con''lict. 
Struggle for poTcr involves the struarle to ac'v.ire ibe legi-
timacy of pover rn^ the instrument of force, both o^ T^hich 
are ultir^atel T vested in th^ stnte. The state is aT so the 
ultimate source for +he distribution of social values. It is, 
therefore, nature! end inevitahIe that socia7 grouvs must 
struggle to acquire -^he ''enitiracy of vODer, the ahility to 
evoke cowpl^^ e , ro ae to achieve the desired social values 
by sharing in the stete's monopoly of armed violence. 
^"^'^k. ^*^^ °"^ ^'' ^TT-'^^-or, "The i n a l ' / s t s of Soc ia l '^o^Afe^gjf* jgn over viev^'cn'i Si/nthesis"', Journal o '' cof^ir 
Wtn. June, 1957, p. 217. ™ 
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Political CO '"etition anri con-°lict in organised 
society scrAse ouci' "^position and resource scarcity" mlthin 
an organised strvr-rure of 'remards. Position scarcity is 
there because no P'^o people en occupy the sane position 
in the reward structure at the son-) time, nor can one 
individual occupy two different positions simultaneously. 
Only a snail number of peor>le can occupy positions o^ arent 
power, privilege and prestiae. Since nany seek them, and 
^04Mce only a fev) con ^ilJ snrh a limited number of valued 
positions, conflict freouently develops over then, 
Tkus, politics cJ'-a.vs presupposes the existence of 
conflict* In tts collective senee, conflict is a process, 
a condition and also an event, Galtung defines it as a 
conditior :"an action systen is said to he in conflict if 
11 the systen has two or more inconpatihle states," It is also 
a- process in the sense that it is strvgcjle over values vhen 
12 
opponents try to neutralise each other. In this may, conflict 
arises out o,' scarcity, or when something is blocking the 
« 
access to- the desired goal, or v^hen rival efforts to obtain 
some value can be seen as the source of frustration. 
We may give certain conron qualities v)hich are present 
in all social conflicts,,an'^ these locld include; at least 
two parties, or distinct units or entities having some minimum 
10, Ibid, p. 218. 
11, Galtung, John. "Institutionalised conflict Resolution", 
Journal of Peace Research, No, A of 1965, p, "^48, 
12, Gurr, Ted Uobert. J^hy Wen Bebel . p, 44, 
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degree of coyitac" i itk* and visibility to, ea'ch other; 
'mutually exclusive and/or mutually incompatihle values 
based on re&ource scnrcitu or position scarcit'i; behaviours 
designed to destroy, injure, thwart, or otherwise control 
another party or parties; a relationship in jnhich the parties 
can gain (relatively) only at each other's expense; mutually 
opposed actiens and counter actions; attempts to acquire pover 
(i,e,, to gain control of scarce resources and positions), or 
to exercise povcer fi.e to influence behaviour in certain 
directions), or the actual acquisition or exercise of povcer. 
Such properties would make a conflict a particular 
kind of social interaction process or "interaction relation-
ships'* between parties who have mutually exclusive or incom-
1 5 patible values. To achieve the .desired value goals in this 
condition/process/event, individuals and social groups resort-
to force and violence, which thus becones a method and techniqi 
for goal achievenent, 
A distinction vhich can be made is one between changes 
"within" and ch'^-iges o^ or, in other morn's conflict "within" 
and conflicts "about" the s us tern. For instance. Closer proposes 
'*to talk of a change o ' system when all major strvctural rela-
tions, its basic institutions and its pmvo iling vnliie systen 
has been drastioal'ij altered,hut,in concrete historical reality, 
no clear ci't ''istinctio exists". ^ ."ore specifically, f'ars'iall 
n» Hack & Snyder. Ibid, pp. 217-219. 
14, Lewis. A coser. "Social conflict and social chrnce", 
British Jovrnal of Sociology, Spptenher, 1957, p, 202, 
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distinguishes '*conflict that arises out of -^he (division of 
labour, conflict, that is to say, over thr terms on vjhick 
cooperation is to take place, as illustrated by a wage 
dispute between the employer and employed", from con-^lict 
over the system itself upon vhich the allocation of functions 
1 T 
and the distrihvtion of benefits are based. 
Because mucn o' snrtai conflict is rooted in rcorcitv 
of valued material rei"ards, it may be said +hat such conflicts 
are economic in origin. Put, inspite o " greater material 
abundance in industrialised countries, economic conOict has 
not disapneared 'here. Large gaps between the rich and poor 
are normally accented in traditional societies, but they become 
irritants in modcrnir^ing countries because of torrents of rising 
expectations. 
Karl UarT was th ^ foremost • proponent of a class-view 
of history, according to which, economic conflict, v^hich is 
eventual 1 y politicised, takes the form of conflict airong 
economic clasces over 'Hstribution of regards. On the baits 
of the .'farxiar. theoru that the state is an instrument of 
oppression an--^ force used by the ruling class to keep the 
exploited classes in su''\fugation, Lenin says,: "The state is a 
product and the manifestation of the irreconciliabilitv of 
class antagonisms. The state arises where, when^and in so far 
as class antaaonicms objectivclv cannot be reconciled. And, 
15. .Marshall, T.H. "The Nature of class conflict", in T.H. 
Marshall, (ed) class conflict and social strat-' /'ication, 
7 -
conversely, the a -irtence of the state vroves that the 
class antagonis r are irreconciliable According 
to Marx, the state is an organ bf clasr, rule, an organ for 
the oppression of one class hi' another, it is the creation 
of order, which legalises and nerpetuates this opprersion 
by moderating the conflict betveen the classes it is 
obvious that the liberation of ->he onnressed clars is 
impossible not onljj rifhout a violent revolution, bvt also 
without the destruction of ihc anparatus of state vc^or v)hich 
was created bv the ruling class and which is the embodiment 
of this 'alienation'" . 
For Lenin and '^ao, "Under conditions of specifiable 
kind, well organised violence is the shortest distance betioeen 
1 7 two points'*. This is in keening v.ith the 'farxian line that 
violence and political revolution are inter-mind, and that 
political revolution bv itself does not create change but 
only expresses transition from one economic syster to another. 
It is this precise that leads to i^ao's contention that "the 
central task and the highest form of revolution is to seize 
18 political po" or by armed force and decide issues by loar," 
It was .^'arx who had said •'•hat the revolutionary role of force 
is that it is the rid-rife of every old society inhich is 
pregnant with the nev. 
16, Lenin, ^'. T. '"''he state and devolution", p, 154, Quoted in 
Anatol Rapoport 'Conflict in Ifan made Environr^ent. p. 151* 
17, Bienen, Henry, Violence and Social Change ',p, 45. 
18, Ibid, p. 70. 
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From among the non~''ar.rian theorists of violpnce, 
f 
Hannah Arendt and Dahrendorf have emphasise'^ the linkage 
between violence and change. Arendt considers violence 
as '*the instrunent of direct intervention in politics," ^ 
and, therefore, a thcor-i of revolution can deal only vtith 
the justification for 'Violenc, and makes distinctions 
between violence as used for destroying existing no'er and 
violence as the necessar-i pre-re^ntisite of change. Dahrendor-" 
conceives of revolution as a rapid and violent socio-political 
change. 
The Structural-Functional ist-Pehavioralist scholars in 
political Science (Lucian Pye, Edward Shils, Clifford Geerts)' 
maintain that the basic cause of internal violence is the lack 
of political integration due to ethnic, regional, Li •'quistic 
or com unal splits and divisions. Pienen points out that 
*'U3 people arc beinn changed fron traditionals into noderns, 
their senBitiv.it]/ to being changed is a source of violence in 
traditional societies. Since change produces more insecurity, 
there must be ownfiiCLtive increase in the degree of angre-
22 
ssion and hostility vithin society," 
19, Arendt, Hannah. On violence. 
20, Dahrendorf P. "^lass h'-'d Qlgsr Conflict in Ir^i/strial 
Societii (Stanford 1959) 
21, Pye, Lucian. -"Aspects o" Political Development; Shils, 
Edward. Political Dcvelopncnt in the /^ e?'' States: Beerts, 
01 i ftp rd.Ol d' iodctieb and He v) States, 
22, Pienen, Ilenrv. 0pp. cit, p, 48, 
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This theoretical discussion lends us to the point 
vohere violence is actually used- as a nethod for v)hr,tever be 
the cause* Dissatisfied and disgruntled elite^ who viay have 
organised groups having a deep sense of outran^ and social 
injustice, possess capability for ens.urinn a planned demons-
tration and, at the sane ti-^e, avoid incrininatina theviselves 
or provoking counter-action against thevise^ves. Tnsterd, fJ<e^i 
nay carry out peaceful de:nonstrations vkich are "designed to 
reveal their strength and irfensitu of iheir co'^^.itted support. 
The "peaceful demonstrations" najj nrovoke violent action anainct 
.then or may cause govern -antal intervention, or so-^e of the 
nore inflanmahle followers ->ay '^ G ignited into unrtlanned 
outburst of violence. Such noes ibil ities are alvjaus implicit 
in such volatile situations. In such situations^ "responsible 
leaders" easiJn find tr.c'-'Selves in the excellent position of 
•^Animum risks and p-a^vi'^iw^- effectiveness. They start bargaining 
with formal authorities. They point out to the authorities that 
their just demands must be accepted, otherwise it. would be 
difficult for them to control their people and "anti-social 
elements'* may create a situation 'in ii'hi<ch anything night havpen. 
And if their prophecies are partially fulfilled,and there are 
sporadic outburst, it would he lorong to assume that the leaders 
would be genuinely sorry. Such events that can dem.onstrate 
violence, inducing others to -\ako concessions, are not to be 
planned. Once the evictions are raised, the problem is to keep 
the events fro"", hanpening. "V-Je'/ "'a.'/ very mell disovn and 
- 70 -
condenn the "a?2t i-social -'lencnfs -^innliyin in the derocrnfic 
peopled peaceful nove'^ents and iw^nlgina in violence" ot't 
the hargaininc noT^rr of 'h^ J earners i.i ^efiniiely pnhaicp\ 
The need ^or violence i^ alvayr present in n societj/ 
pregn^-nt rith 1 pnc ions r^'^-' lin^ ^"ro"^ cocic'^ sc^ f-c-i t". Qni 
the spark is ne^^de' o-^' provided. "'ho •provir'es -"ip cpnrk 
detemines the utility c^ violenrc. Put the nature and need 
of violence nc v f^e eriila ined in terns of social horgaini-^a, 
where violence heco^^es a continuation o^ the political rroce' 
and is a tool, a let'od and a technique, to achieve desired 
objectives. 
- II 
TYPOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 
Violence^ derived from the Latin word "uiolentia", 
is an act of physical force. It involves the infliction 
on other people of injury, physical or mental in character; 
it involves compulsion or res traint. It is thr ^'reat or 
use of force resulting, or intended to result, in the 
injury or forceable restraint or intimidation of persons 
•f 
or the destruction or foreeahle seizure of property. Acts 
of violence are those which kill or injure persons or do 
significant damape to property. It is physical force used 
by a person, directly or through a weavon, to hurt, destroy 
or control another or to damage, destroy or control an 
object (e.g. property or territory). Violence is the most 
distinct and severe form of physical force. 
Violence is, 'Hhe exercise: of physical force so as 
to inflict injury on or cause damage to person or property, 
action or conduct characterised by this; treatment or usage 
tending to cause bodily injury or forcibly interfering with 
personal freedom. 
When people act against their will, desire, intention 
or inclination, it means they are being forced to do something 
1. Progress Report of the U.S. National CommAssion on the 
causes and prevention of violence, US' government,1969,p.3. 
2. Haag, E. V,, Political violence and, civil Disobedience,T). 54» 
3. Mackenzie, W.J.'f. Power,, Violence, Decision. Penguin. 
1975, p. 39. 
- 12 -
Force is the reserve capability and means of exercising 
physical power. Acts of force, prevent the normal free 
acts of individuals, or johich inhibit them through the 
threat of violence. To Aristotle, '^Bia"" means both force 
and violence - to make a thing move against its own natural 
internal tendency, when the cause o f action lies in things 
outside the actor, and when the actor contributes not' ing. 
Coercion is^any social co-npulsion - usually some form of 
institutioralispd force. Violence is thus, restricted to 
the sense of destructive harm - hence, n destructive kind 
of force. The tioo terms, force an^^ violence, are often 
confused, A detachment of nolice'ien against demonctrn tors 
represents force, 7hen " ^v use their weavons, if is violence, 
When a group of universi ty students sei^e a university 
building they have used force. I^hen they destroy property 
or inflict physical injury to persons, they have resorted 
to violence. 
Force is also involved in a threat of violence or 
counter violence. When violence is actually used, it may 
constitute onlv a demonstration of force, a limited and 
symbolic net to give the demonstration and capability of 
further action. The thing which is forced must retain and 
preserve its identity, otherwise it is not forced but dest-
royed and t^is destruction involves violence. 
4» jVieberg, ILL. Pol itical violence: The Behavioural 
Proces. p. 11, 
5. Jammer, Max, Concepts of Force : A stud]/ in the Foundations 
of Dynamics. p. 37, 
6, Walter, B. 7. Terror and Besistence : A studji of Political 
violence, p. 40. 
t*, 7J — 
Galtung differentiates cix important aimensions oj 
violence, by drawing a distinction between; 
(i) Physical and biological violence 
(ii) Negative and positive approach to influence; 
(iii) Whether or not there is an object that is hurt; 
(iv) Whether or not there is a subject(person) who acts 
(v) violence that is intended or unintended; and 
(vi) the two traditio'^al levels of violence, the r>anifest 
and the Intent, He refers essentiallij to two types of 
violence, vis,, personal and direct (where there is in 
actor that co^pits the violence) and structural or indirect 
(where there is no such aciorj.. He adds that s tructural 
violence is sovetines referred to as social injw^tice, 
because it 'is that violence which is '^built into the struc-
ture and shovjs up a'^ unequal power and consequently as unequal 
7 
1 ife chances'*. 
With our theoretical constraints, we may select a 
few variables for the study of political violence: 
(i) Biots: 
This would mean any demonstration or clash of a 
large group of citizens. Violence implies the use of 
physical force and is generally evinced by the destruction 
of propert", ihe kiTJing or wounding of people, or the use 
of riot control e<.ivir,nent. They are distinguished from 
arned attack events on the basis of whether the event seems 
7. Galtung, John, "Violence, Peace and Peace Research" 
Journal of Peace Research, K'o, 6, 1969, p, 171. 
..:|<'- U -
to have been organised, whether it is goal directed, and 
whether tt involves all or most of the participants acting 
purposefully, 
(ii) Armed Attack events: 
This would cover acts of violence committed by or 
involving organised groups with weapons of any kind, when 
these acts are intended as protests, or acts of revolt or 
rebellion against a govervment, its members, policies, or 
•intended pol icies, etc* 
(Hi) Political strikes: 
Any strike by industrial or service workers, or 
students, for the purpose of protestimg against a government, 
its leaders, or a governmental policy or action, 
, (iv) i^^;sassinations : 
Any, politically motivated murder or attempted murder 
of high government official or politician, 
Galtung seeks to build an elaborate typology composed 
•i 
of four major groups : 
(i) Classical (or direct) violence; 
(ii) Repress iofi - deprival of human right; 
(iii) Poverty - deprival of basic material needs; and 
(iv) Al ienation - deprival of higher needs. Each of the 
four groups cover the categories included in brackets: 
15 -
(i) Classical violence ^survival); 
(ii) Poverty (Phys-^ological, Ecolopical and social); 
(Hi) Repression (Freedom,' Politics, Legal work); and 
(iv) Alienation (Relation to society, relation to others, 
relation to self and relation to nature). 
Violence, in reference to past actions of those on 
whom it is inflicted, is punitive, When it discharges persent 
emotions, it is expressive, and when it is used instrument ally 
to get things valued (other than power or prestige) it is 
acquisitive; and when it is used to acquire, extend or retain 
g 
power and authoritxi, it is political. Counter violence is 
defensive and nay be deterrent of rbtaliatory as well,Difference 
between internal war and violence of the revolutionary dimension 
is one of scale. Turmoil is unorganised political violence 
erupting relatively spontaneously and includes violent strike, 
riots, political clashes and localised rebellions. Conspiracy 
is organised political violence with limited participation, and 
includes organised political assassinations, small scale 
terrorism, mutinies. Inter al loar is also organised volitical 
violence, with wide spread povular participation, and includes 
large scale terrorism, ^guerrilla wars and is designed to change 
constitutions, rulers or pol ides. 
8, Galtung John, "The specific contribution of peace Research 
to the study of the causes of violence: Typolonies, ^WES'CO 
paper 1975, 
9, Haag, Ernest. Van den. Political violence and civil 
Disobedience, p, 56, 
10, Eckstein, Harry, "Internal war: Problems and Approaches, p, 133* 
Terror is an ambiguous term, conventionallj/ meaning 
a type of violent action designed to make people afraid. 
Suggesting extreme apprehension, a psychic state, producing 
11 typical patterns of reactive Pehavior, Process of terror 
compounds three elements: the o.ct or threat of violence, the 
emotional reaction and the social ef-fecfs, A violent act 
is incomplete, because it is directed to an end: the ultimate 
aim is control and the proximate air. is to instil terror. 
There may be violence vnthout terror but no terror is possible 
without violence. Those loho use terror do not aim to eliminate 
the group that is to be terrorised but control it by m.ezis of 
violence and terror. A part o'" the group is destroyed to 
instil terror in the whole, but the group as such is not wiped 
out. Violence destroys group as a groun, making structural 
changes in the society. Only the latter is an irreversable 
change. System of terror depends upon the position of those 
who use terror - whether t'-ey work against or connive with 
the dominant power structure* It is designed to over-throw a 
system of authority, by creating extreme fear through systemic 
12 
violence. It is a seige of terror or agitational terror. 
System of terror may also be directed by those who control the 
institutions of power. If, instead of relying on legitimate 
and conventional modes of acquiring submission, the rulers 
11. Walter, E.V, Ibid, pp. '^-7 
12, Walter, E.V. Ibid, p. 7. 
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initiate a process of p i f ^ ^ | ft mai/ be called a reaime of 
terror or enforcement ter*r&i^m The aim of the seige of 
terror (agitational) is to disrupt the masses and incumbents 
of power. By showing the weakness of this frame-work the 
insurgents demonstrate t^^eir own strength and the weakness 
of the authorities. This is the symbolic value of the act 
1A 
of terror. Often, the insurgents resort to terror because 
they lack the politico! strength to avail of constitutional 
procedures and, by their own terror, they attempt to provoke 
the authorities i-^to repressive measures (enforcement terror) 
in order to claim that the constitutional machiner / is now 
unavailable. 
It is characteristic of acts of terror that they 
appear entirely unprocticable and arbitrary to the society 
which suffers therf. Political terror is different from other 
forms of violence - agitation, intimidation and coercion - by 
virtue of its extreme and ruthlessly destructive methods. 
These may range from genocide, massacre and pol itical murder 
and torture at one end of the scale of violence, to physical 
beatings, harassment and defamation campaigns at the other. 
There is rlso a distinction between political terror and 
political terrorism. Po~ itical terror may occur in isolated 
13. Eckstein, Harry. opp,-cit. p. 72. 
14, Ibid, p, 77. 
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acts and also in the form of extreme indiscriv'inate and the 
arbitrary mass viole^cef the kind of insurrectionary out-
burst that characterised the lynchinns and killings at the 
15 height of popular terror in the revolutionary France, 
This is not a systematic terror, is unorganised and is usually 
impossible to- control. Political terrorism is a sixs+ained 
policy involving the ^raging of organised terror either on the 
part of the state, a movement, a faction or by a small group 
of individuals (i,e, Sikh terrorism). Systematic terrorism 
invariably entails some organisational structure, hovwver 
rudimentary, and som.e kind of theory or ideology of terror. 
Surprisingly, Che Guevara appears most charry of unilising 
terrorism, for fear that government repression will cost the 
insurgents more t^^an they gain. 
Tactically, provocative terror must be highly discri-
minate in order to provoke the type of response desired. 
The target is not so much the victir, mho will probably be 
killed and thus no longer involved in the action. The target 
is the identification group, the incumbent elite - who will 
take the desired retaliatory action. The response to be 
achieved must be one of fear, so that the target will react 
17 
and will react specifically in a logical and predicted manner. 
15, Wilkinson, Paul Political Terrorism ,(!!ac Millan: 1974)y-D,17, 
16, Guevara, Che, On Guerrilla Warfare, Praeger, 1961, p, 59, 
17, Thornton, Thomas Perri'. "Terror As a Weapon" in Eckstein,Hdrry^ 
(ed,) Internal War ; problems and Approaches, pp, 87-88, 
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Two categories may be given for the systems of terror 
and this depends on whether these systems work against or 
for the dominant political structure. The first is oriented 
toward overthrowing a system of authority either to enable 
the terrorist to sei"e control or to clear the way for some 
other group approver' by then. In this type, the terrorists 
may be recruited externally from foreign enemies of the 
system under attack, or drawn from inciegenous rebells or 
revolutionaries. Its vurvose is to destroy the authority 
system by creating extreme fenr through systematic violence. 
This type is usually knovm as the seige of terror. The other 
category included the systems of authority and are directed 
by those who already control the power system. Instead of 
relying on conventional methods of obtaining obedience, the 
men in power choose to initiate the process of terror. This 
form is usually known as the regime of terror. 
In his verv exhaustive study. Terror and Resistance: A 
Study of Political Violence, E.V, Walter categorises the 
systems and-process of terror (ovp.cit., p. 8): The specific 
act or threat of violence may be a form of involuntary behav-
iour, a deliberate action or an intentional course of action. 
If the act or threat is not chosen or if it is produced by 
abnormal psychic processes and can not be vnthheld, it is 
involuntaru If the act or threat is vjilled, it is deliberate 
violence. If the psychic effect and reactive behaviour are 
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also willed, then the act or threat is intentional terroris-^. 
The concept "process of terror", inclu'des all three. .'Vthounh 
the pattern of calculated terrorism is the one fkat cnrzcs 
most readily to mind, sjistems of tnrror are also esiablished 
by persons who do not "viant" then. Thus, the presence or 
absence of deliberateness is not crucial to the defirition, 
although it ''•'^ natural to associate terrorism with deliherate 
acts of violence and their consequences. Involuntary behav-
iour, including psychotic acts of violence, must • included. 
The relative amounts of calculated action and involunfrvTi 
behaviour may he important in constructing a tupologij of 
terror process, but the involuntary event can not ha tal'en 
as the limiting case, 
Friedrich defi^-es Political revolution as a sudden 
1R 
and violent overthrow of an established political order, 
ICamenZka believes that "revolution is a sharp, sudden change 
in the social location of political poiper express ina itr.elf in 
the radical trans fornatiov of the nrocess of governr^ent, of 
the official foundat'''rns of sovereignty or legitimacy and of 
the conception of the soc^'al order. Such transforr^ations 
could not normally occur without violence, but if they did, 
1 9 they would still though bloodless, be revolution" Tanter 
18, Friedrich, Carl J. "An Introductory Note on Revolution" 
in Friedrich, ed., RevolutiQ-^.. 1967, P. 5, 
19, Kamenka, Sngene* "The concept of a political Revolution" 
in friedrich. Ibid, p. 124, 
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and 'Hdlarsky hoi' 'lat a revolution may he said to exist 
when a group of insurgents illeoally or -forcefully chanlJenges 
the governnental elite for the occupancy of roles in the stru-
cture of political authority, A succ&ssful revolution occurs 
when, as a result of the chalJ enges to the governmental elite, 
insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles loit^in 
20 the structure of political authority, Hannah Arendt holds 
that "only where change occurs in the sense of a new begining, 
where violence is used to constitute on altogether di fferent 
form of government, to bring about the formation of a new 
body politic, where the liberation from ovvression aims at 
least by the constitution of freedom can we speak of revolu-
21 
tion. According to Johnson "True revolution is the nccevt-
ance of violence in order to cause the system to change when 
all else has failed, and the very idea of revolution is contin-
22 gent uron this perception of societal failure",. According to 
Amann political regimes exist by virtue of two cor^Ht o^s : 
their monovoly of means of physical force, and t^-> -existence 
of a widely shared habit of obedience among the -lames ; and 
as such, a revolution i$ "a breakdown, momin'-ary or prolonged, 
of the state's monopoly of power, usually accompnived by a 
23 lessening of the habit of obedience, 
20, Tantor, Raymond and Hidlarsky, Manus, "A Theory of 
Revolution", Journal of Peace Research, No, 11,1957, 
21, Arendtf Hannah. On Revolution, Viking 1963, p, 28. 
22, Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary change ', Boston,1966, p.12, 
23, Amann, Fetter, H, "Revolution; A Redefinition", Pol itical 
Science Quarterly, 77(1962), p, 38, 
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On the basis of all these definitions, we nay identify 
certain dimensions or components of revolution: 
(i) At a general level - revolution is a form of change, 
(ii) Change is relatively abrupt, 
(iii) This change is striking and far reaching and a f feds 
the behaviour patterns of significant segments of the 
Dopulation, 
(iv) Political revolution requires a mass movement , 
(v) Political revolution involves a poner transfer, a change 
in the distribution of political power, a transformation 
of the ruling class, 
(vi) This power transfer aims at, seaks, or sets the stage 
for broader social change, 
(vii) Revolutionary change is illegal, extra legal, there are 
no provisions for it and it is unauthorised, 
(via) Revolutionary change does not take place except through 
violence, because change is resisted by the existing 
authorities. '*Non-violent pol'-^'cal revolution'^ is a 
contradiction in terms. 
Some scholars understand revolution simply as "the 
25' 
acceptance of 'violence in order to bring about change, or as" 
24, Rejai, Mostafa, The comparative strategy of revolutionary 
strategr/, p. 8, 
25, Chalmers, Johnson, Revolution and the social siictem. p, 10. 
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wide 
the£range of circumstances from mere threat of force 
to major civil "wars in which illegitimate violence is 
employed within a country to affect political change",^ 
Alfred Meyer defines revolution in terms of three 
distinct processes: the destruction of an ancien r'iaifne, 
a period of chaotic- disorder and the creation of a new 
27 
order or political system. 
.28 Fellick Gross distinguishes four types of revolutions:' 
(i) A "revolution from below" refers to a mass novement, in 
part spontaneous, which, developing slowlij, eventually 
explodes in a cataclysmic upheaval leading to far reac-
hing, political and social change, 
(it) A "revolution from above" is a planned, organiajd, non-
spontaneous seizure of political peer by a snail groun 
of armed men at the very top of t^ ' political structure. 
It entqils a rapid takeover of V 3 renteers of government 
authorities, or of the means of '-Lo-ence and of the media 
of communication and transvortat on. There is no intentioi 
however to introduce social change. 
26, Cyrel E, Black and Thomas P, Thornton, Communism 
and Revolution : The strategic uses of Political 
violence, p, 4, 
27, Alfred G, Meyer, "The Functions of Ideology in 
Soviet volitical system,"Soviet fftudies. Vol.17, 
1976, p, 275, 
28, Fellick, Gross. The Seizure of Political Power in 
a Century of Revolutions,- p, 39, 
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(Hi) A " combined seizure" contains elements of both 
revolution from below and re volution from aoove : in 
a moment of mass unrest, a group of armed ran seizes 
the political and governmental apparatus, 
(iv) A " palace revolution " refers to a transfer of porer, 
sometimes violent, within the ruling group. The seizure 
is engineered by a dissident faction mitkin the elite 
(e* 9't family or party), not by an out side group such 
as the military. There is no intention to initiate 
political or social change, 
James Rosenau identifies three types of civil strife 
( or revolution )t "Personnel" conflicts he defines as 
struggles over current roles in the existing structures with 
the aspirations to change mapor iDolicies or the structure of 
society, Latin American coups d' etat fall into this category, 
"Authority conflicts are conflicts over the arrangenents as 
well as the occupancy of fhe roles in the political structure 
and with the aspirations to change major policies or the struc-
ture of society. Colonial struggle for independence or conflicts 
to replace authoritnrian governments with more representative 
forms furnish examples of such wars, finally, " structural" , 
strife includes not onli/ conflict over personnel and the struc-
ture of political authoritu, but also over major policies and 
29. James N, Rosenau, ^nternaiional jjspect of Civil 
Strife. p, 634. 
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th'e structure of society iiMtlft Communist insurrections, 
agrarian revolts, and urban based mas^ uprisings characterise 
this third form of civil strife. 
A couT> d* etat is " an unexpected, forceful substitution 
of one ruling group for another or at lenst any sucfden success-
ful unconstitutional alteration in government". Although 
unexpected, its occurence is seldom inconceivable. It is 
seldom that a successful coup is anticipated at the precise 
moment of its occurence. Coups are consummated by the threat 
of use of force, yet there need not be violence. Violence 
may ensure after the coup has taken place and may take the 
form of isolated executions of some traitors. A coup is 
normally carried out by a small group of individuals whose 
deliberations and decisions have been secret and whose organi-
sation has been conspiratorial. ~ The'ooup d' etat represents 
the seizure of a state's symbols of authority and its mechanism 
for coercion, but this seizure does not in itself necessarily 
lead to social revolution.' 
It is intersting how Bej'ai explains the coup: "a coup 
is quite, secret affair. It does not involve the people but 
is presented to them as a fait accompli. The actors are usually 
public officials of some sort. In fact, one may identify two 
types of coups, depending on the officials involved". 
30. Laden, CarL,and Schmitt, Carl. The Politics of Violence. 
Revolution in the Modern World, p. 22. 
31. Ibid, p. 23 
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An intera-elite coup (that is a palace revolution) 
is a coup within the existing ruling in which one faction 
overthrows another, Khrushchev's ouster by Breshnev and 
Kosygin in 1964 is a fair example. An inter-elite coup is 
a coup from outside the existing ruling group, one in which 
"52 the military is characteristically involved. 
In the categories discussed above, it is the "intention"' 
of the actor in actually using or threatening violence that is 
the basis of criterion and such intentions may be classified 
33 in three types. Deterrence from undesired action; punish^ent 
for negatively valued acts actually committed; and symbolic 
demonstration of capacity to act. 
Ordinary eruptions of violence on the part of the public 
ordinarily come out of social cleavages and are not necessarily 
aimed at affecting the decisions of formal authority. On the 
other hand, coercive public nrotest (which is aggregative 
.violence and is public as opposed fio clandestine), imposes 
constraints upqn authority by presence and actions. 
Coercive public protest may assume six primary forms:-
(i) Process ion and public meetings; 
(ii) boycotts, strikes and work stoppage not airied at the 
employers; 
32, Rejai, Mostafa. The Comparative Study of Revolutionary 
Strategy, p,20. 
33, Parsons,Talcott, " The Place of Force in Social Process", 
in Harry, Eckstein, Internal War, p, 35, 
34, Bayley, David H. "The P-edagogy of Democracy", The American 
Pol itical Science Review, Septem'her, 1962, p, 663, 
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(iiij fasts; 
(tv) obstructions; 
(v) courting of arrests; and 
Cvi) riots. 
These forms are grouped into two main division, legal 
and illegal. Category of illegal protest divides itself into 
violent and non-violent,' 
Protest 
Breakdown of Discipline Illegal 
L&pal 
T 
Non-violent Violent 
(Plt§fi^ssions, Public meetings, 
Sftlh-m^'g So^ottS, Fasts,-
ffar*ial. Work stoppage) 
Obstruction Courting 6f Arrest 
Failure of the Authority at 
this end, lead to - - - - . > Riot 
Here **A", "5" and "^" may be thus explained: 
(A) direct action drives out the orderly constititional responses 
in democratic states, and its success establishes a precedent for 
its adoption b" other individuals and groups. 
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(B) At this 'H'T, coerc^ive public protest ''^ecomes a big 
rival to the process of peace ful. change through democratic 
government, 
(C) Failure of the authority to achieve desired and 
expected ends leads to the assu-^.ption that certain ends 
Justify recourse to undemocratic means. 
Another kind of violence is i-he one used hy the 
authorities to preserve the establishment. Sometimes, 
violence is directed hy those who already control the insti-
tutions of power but, instead of relying on conventional and 
legitimate techniques, thev initiate a process of terror vhich 
may be called a regi'^e of terror. Because the reactive beha-
vio'ir is willed, the violent threat or act is intentional 
terrorism. This intentional terrorism produces fear reactions 
yielding social effects upon which the stability of the poli-
tical system depends. 
The basis of the stahiJ ity of the government lies with 
the satisfaction of the people, and this satisfaction of a 
demonant clas ^ is an imrediate source o ' danger. It is also 
believed that these personsiohom the government is truing to 
satisfy expect it to prevent any harm to them. Therefore, 
it is absolutely bevond the grasp of conventional politico 1 
thinking to believe that a government might exercise violence 
againjt the very persons it was trying to satisfy. Thus, it is 
29 -
difficult f'-r most peonle to believe in the existence of 
a governmert, based ^/p. consent, using continual violence 
as a regular technique on itc ovm people, because it is 
believed that ofder is baS'.ri on consent, one proceeds to 
believe further that viole^f governments (violence= absence 
of order) are not based o consent. 
In this, what is over-looked is that a government 
based on consent (or^^cr) may resort to violence to preserve 
order, so that the person on vihose consent it is based may 
be satisfied. !7hen voluntarji obedience is not forthcoming, 
then legitimately covered, violence is used as a raw techninue. 
Social violence is an "assault upon an individual or his 
property solely or primarilu because of his membership in a 
social category'*. According to this definition, a fight 
between two boys, one Hindu and one ''uslim^v)ould not be an 
instance of social biolence in itself. If, hoioever, others 
(^'O'S and/or adults) joined in on the basis of religious 
affiliation, it would be a social violence. Obviously, violent 
events which begin.cis non-social violence may, during their -
course, be converted into social violence. Social violence 
is, in fact, an assault upon the accommodative structure of 
56 the society. If there is a belief that the laio and order 
35* Grimshaw, Allen D, "Interpreting collective violence", in 
the Annals of ^he American Academu of political Science. 
Sept. 1970, p. 12. 
36. Grimshaw, Allen D. "Three views of urban violence", i-
the {••'ericnn Behavioral Scientist. No. 4 of 1968, p. 2. 
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agencies are i"eah or mrtison (or i^oth) social violence 
is more likely to occur and spread than if there is a belie''' 
that those agencies are strong and non-partison. Grimshaw 
concludes-'^ that either the government my assume a passive 
posture while tacitly approving assault by one group on 
another, or the governnent nay even take a hands*off posi-'ion", 
not favouring any group in a social violence. This latter 
maynoccur either because t^e novernment is too weak to enforce 
peace or because it hope to aain -from the mutual veakenirq 
of groups engaged in a con ^lict. 
37. Grinshai', Allen D, "'~hree views of urban violence", 
in the American Behavioral Scientist. No, d of 1968, p. " 
Chapteii:yIII 
"SOURCES OF VIOLENCE" 
About the general sources of violence some psijcholoaicaJ 
assunptions man ' 's piven one!, in most theoretical anproarhes, 
one or another of these assurzr>tions is inplicit. 
There are five well knovm theories of etiolop^i of 
violence that nay be given in this connection: 
(i) The Frustration - Aggression theory, developed 
by John Bollard. 
(it) Concept of Relative Deprivation by Ted Robert Gurr. 
(iii) J-Curve principle of Davies. 
(iv) Feierahrnds ' theonj of social change and systenic 
frustration, 
(v) The theory of modernisation causing violence in 
developing societies, by Huntington. 
The psychological assurr^ptions about' the generic sources 
of human aggression nay be categorised into three: 
(a) Aggression is instinctive, 
(b) That it is learned, 
(c) That it is an action-response activated by 
frustration. 
K Bollard, John. Frustration and Aggression (Nev' Haven), 19'^)P.; 
Also Elton D, Hoc llei-l^ "Psiichology and Agression" Journal of 
conflict Resolution, June 19'^9, pp, 195-294. 
2, Gurr, Ted Ro'bert, "^hy yen Rebel (Princeton 1970), 
J . Jar^es, C Davies, "Tovmrd a theory o f Revolution", Anerican 
SpciologicaJ Review, ^ebruary, 1962, pp. 5-19. 
4. Hugh, Davis Grahan.^nnd Ted Robert Gurr» (ed). The History of 
The first assunipiicin is based on IJ^iherg's proposition 
regarding man's capacity for uncontrolled, hitter and bloody 
violence. Instinctual drives are physiological drives that 
are necessary for life's preservation and continuation. On 
this basis, it is said that all huran actions are directed by 
a combination of instinctual inpulses an^^, therefore, all 
human actions contain elencntr, of agoreasion. This theory 
assumes that men have, rithin them, an autonomous source of 
aggressive impulse, that erhihits "irresistable outbreaks lohich 
recur with rhythnicol regularity." Freud believes that man is 
equipped mith instinctive tendencies of destructiveness ^nd 
p 
aggression that are rooted in the death instinct. He gives a 
qualified attribution of the impulse to destructiveness to a 
death instinct. The self-destruction is prevented by the 
,turning outward of the aggressive impulses. Attacks upon others 
provide an outlet for *he energy of the death instinet. 
g 
Lorens views aggression as a survival enhancing instinct. 
When the aggressive instinct cannot be satisfied because of 
environmental frustrations, sel-^ destructiveness increases, v ith 
the result thrt, to prevent self destruction, the individual hcts 
5. Huntington, Sanuel P, Political Order in Changing Soceities , 
(Hew Haven I968), pp. '^P-'^O. • 
6. Neiberg, H.L. Political viol once: The '^ehavioral Process . 
(New "^ork: I96I); Also "The Threat of violmrr -n'- social 
change, Anerican political science Revier, December 1962,p.870. 
7. Lor ens, Konard, 'On Aggression . p. XII 
6, Brovm, J, '<\ The psychr^dynamics of Abnormal Behavior . p. 156 
9. Ibid. 
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to destroy others through violent actions. Hostile behavicr 
has to be stimuloted by an appropriate stinuless mhich may 
be some frustrating event. 
The other assumption is that aggressive behaviors are 
learned and rused strategically to acquire particular goals. 
This assumption is reflected in the riritinns of Chalmers Johnson, 
who speaks of civil violence as purposive and contributing to 
11 the demise of the despicable social system, Talcott Parsons 
fits political biolence into the framework of social interaction 
theoryt as a deterrance a simbolic dennnstration o " copacitj/ 
to act. It assumes that violence is a learned response, raiiona-
listically chosen and dispassionately employed in the struggle 
for scarce values, '^ , Jright ''ills says that the ultimate kind 
of power is violencey rhereas all politics is a struggle for 
12 power, thus making violence a technique to acquire noioer 
requisite for the achievement of other noals. Johnson speaks of 
civil violence as "purposive forms of behavior intended to 
disorient the behavior of others, thereby bringing ahoutnthe 
demise of the hated social system". 
According to this assumvtion, people become aggressive 
rjhen they think that such behavior 'vHll help them, achieve 
particular nonls. Aggression is at fim.es a stratanem in the 
10. Johnson, Chalmers. RevoJutionary Cha^ige (loston 19^^>) 
pp. 1P-1^'. 
11. Parson, Talcott. "Some reflections on the Place of ^oree in 
Social Process", in Ilarrij^ Ecksteinfed), Internal vmr : 
Problems and Approaches, pp. 34-3''^-
12. .'fills. C. Vrinhf. THP Pnvor' mi+o r^ 171 
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competition bettoeen §r&ups for inconpattable goals. Violent 
anti-Semitic policinr, of Nazi Gernany were carried out for 
political purposes. Hitler used anti-semit ism to achieve 
an ideolocical rrconciliai ion of basically contradictory 
appeals. He satis ^ied the Gernan middle class that there 
mould he no labour trouble a'^'ter the elimination of the 
Jewish agitators, and at the sa^e time could hoodioink' the 
workers that their econom.ic difficul ties mould be removed 
when Jevnsh capitalists were exterminated. Thus, Hitler 
employed anti-Semitic violence merely for political ends 
because expression of these hostile attitudes made is 
possible for the Nasis to say other things that attract 
people. 
The third assumption has been advanced by Bollard, 
who maintains that the primary source of human capacity for 
violence avpears to be --he frustration - aggression mechanism. 
The anger induced by frustration is a motivating force that 
disposes men to aggression. Frustration is an interference 
with goal directed behavior, an event in which goal directed 
activity is blocked, slowed up or otherwise interfered with. 
Whenever goal seeking ac-'^ivity has been initiated but there 
exists some barrier to satis faction (such as obstacles, 
defficiencies, conflicts J, a fri'strating situation develops. 
As an event, it is thn thvmrting circumstances that interfere 
with goal directed activity. Four kinds of frustrating 
14. Bollard John 0pp.cit, as in ref, 1 
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conditions may emerge: 
(i) physical barriers, 
(ii) Delays between the initiations and comvlption 
of the response seouence, 
(iii) Omission or reduction of a customary reward, and 
(ivj The eliciting of a response tendency that is 
in~compatible loith the on going one. 
The basic postulate o-^ the theory, as propounded by 
Bollard and Berkowits, is that the occurence of apgressibe 
behavior always presupposes the existence of frustration anrf, 
contrarywise, that the existence of frustration always leads 
to some form of aggression. Whether the instigation to aggre-
ssion leads to open hostility depends upon other factors. 
Aggressive response occurs by external nues, that is, ^'-hen the 
frustrated (and angered) person seises and attackable object 
or person that he associates with the source of frustration. 
In further refornulation of the theory, Pastore found that 
inSividuals give less aggressive response to a frustration, 
if they regard frustration to be reasonable, justi '"table and 
not arbitrary. Usually, they believe that the governnent 
imposes, through its compliance sanctions, certain deprivations 
which are "reasonable". They refrain from, aggressive responses 
because ihey consider the frustrating aciions as proper. There 
is general agreement that 'he more r^aTadjus'ed the individual is. 
15, Berkowits, Leonard. Ag.'^ression : A -Social Ps^'cholopicnl 
Analysis . Chapter V, 
^ e ^ ^ — 
the More likely he is ^w.f^uct agrjressively to both arbitrary 
and non-arbitrarji frustrations. Any protest on the part of 
the individual is clearly an attempt to renove an interference 
to goal achievement and, therefore, "is indicative of frus-
1 ^ 
tration in the individual," 
The other theory of etiology.of violence is derived 
from the concept of Relative Deprivation (RD) by Tsd Robert 
Gurr, This RD is defined by Gurr as a perceived descripancy 
between an individuals perceptions o'" his value expectations 
(the value people believe that they are rightfully entitled to) 
and value psotion (the level of value actually achieved). 
The hypothesis of Ted Robert Gurr is that the potential for 
collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and the 
scope of relative deprivation among newbers of a collectivity. 
The primary causal sequence in political violence is, first, 
the developnent o " discontent; second, the politicisation of 
their discontent; and, finally, its actualisation in violent 
action. 
From Aristotle to LassioeU, deprivation has been 
identi "ied in theoretical analyses as the most general precondi-
tion of violence. Aristotle believes that the principal cause 
of revolution is the <ier,ire for econonic and pol i iical egu,ality 
16, Levy, Sheldon. "The P'--'icholoau of Political Activity", in 
the AnnTsils of 'lie Arzericcn Academy of Politirnl Science. 
September 1970,'p. 85. 
17, Gurr, Ted Robert, Opy.cit. p, 24. 
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on the part of the nasses V'ho lack it and the destine of 
oligarchs for preater ineannJ. itj/ than 'hcrj have 
descripancy in both the instances between lohat people have 
18 
relative to rihat they think is justly theirs, Ilocelits 
and Wilner also link deprive tion rith the potential for 
violence: "Unrelated aspirations produce feelinps of 
disappointment, but unrealised expectations result in feelings 
of deprivation. Disappointment is generally tolerable. The 
deprived ind-^vidual feels impelled to renedy, by lohatever neani 
are available, the material and psychic frustrations produced 
in him. Whereas disappointment may breed the needs of incipi-
ent revolution, deprivation serves as a catalist for revolu-
19 
tionary action," Lassioell and Kaplan believe that a poli-
tical instabili-'ji is the result of the descripancj/ between 
expectations and "the degree of reali^aiioii o ~ value for the 
masses. It is a lov) degree o ' realisation - disparity hetveen 
20 
value position and value "demanded and expected," 
21 
In thej-curve principle, Davies attibut^s violence to 
the frustration which results from a short term decline in 
achievement folloinina long term increase that generated 
expectations abour continuing increase. The Davies theory 
of revolution is that "revolutions are most likel]/ to occur 
18, Ueldon, J.K.O. The Politics o ^ Aristotle . p. 3^8. 
19. Hoselit.'Sj Pcri-tcnd 7'il''nrr, Ann. "Economic Development, 
Politicol "Itraic'-irr. and Ancricm Aid," in 'forion Kaplan's 
The Revolution in mrld polities, p, 36J, 
20. Lasswell, Herold. and Kcplon, ''orton. Pov'er an-^ Societj/. p.264, 
21, Davies, Jc-es. •'^, Opp, cit. 
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when a prolonged period of objective econonic and social 
op development is followed hv short period of sharp reversal.' 
Soule is also of the vievi that chanpe is more res^^onsihle 
than oppression for violence- " vihcn the peovle are in their 
most desperate and miserable condition, they are often least 
inclined to revolt, for than they are helpless. Only after 
their position is sonevhat improved and thev have sensed the 
possibility of change, do the^i revolt effectively against 
oppression and injustice, ''Tint touches off insurrect'^on is 
hope, not lack of it, rising confidence not bleak suffering. 
This implies that the scope for violence increases vhen economic 
expectations, resu" ting from econoivic improvement are blocked 
by economic adversity and the inability of the socio-political 
system to take remedial action. The suffering mhich is under-
taken patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as 
the idea of escaping from it is conceived. Men whose economic 
lot is improving aspire for greater political participation, 
and vice versa, failing which they become more susceptible 
to violence, 
« 
Galtung loro^ooses that any aggression, even crime, 
rebellion and war, is caused by "rank diseguilibria", that 
is, a lack of consistence in the rankings of individuals, 
groups or nations on whatever value hierarchies are relevant 
to them. It nerns value expectations of a group for higher 
22, Ibid p. 6, 
23» Soule, George. The Coning American Revolution, p. 20, 
24> Galtung, John. "A Structural Theory o "" Aggression", 
Journal of Peace Research. IJo.2 of 19^4, p* 95. 
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status are increased in case of an increare in Its share 
of v>el fare values. If a prnup hos attained a hiph rank 
in the social distrihufion of one value, it I'Jill exppct a 
corresponding ranK on other values also. If its status 
attributes are differently ranked on the social hierarchy, 
the group will be dissatisfied and prone to violence. 
25 Davies holds that, contrary to ."arxian nrinciples 
or the assunptions of Alexis de Tocqueville, revolutions 
do not occur during periods of prolonged or worseninr 
situations of social devrivation. On the contrary, revolu-
tions are perpetrated durina periods of relative nrosperity 
and improvement. Thus, Davies postulates a J-curve of socio-
economic development and projects revolution/violence at that 
point 0'" thr curve vhere dcscripancy hetmeen achievement and 
expectations is intolerable. 
Feierabends ' theory of social change and sustematic 
frustration develops the hypothesis of svstenic frustration, 
which is amnlicable to any analysis of agnregate, violent 
political behaviour vHthin social systems. Systemic frustrn-" 
tion is de'^ined as one collectively experienced viithin society 
25. Davies, James. 0, 0pp. ci t. 
26, In Grahan & Gurr, 0pp. cit, pp. 635-8. 
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particularly "i^ith reference to three situations :-
(a) due to interference in the atiainnent and 
maintenance of social aoals, aspira fions 
and values; 
(b) due to sii.ilar si-nultancous experience hy 
nenhere of a social aggregate; and 
(c) due to strain produced within the structures 
and processes of a social cysten. 
According to this theory^ violent political behaviour is 
instigated hu si/stetic frustration and sustenic frustration 
is instigated fro^^ snecific characteristic of serial change. 
Syste'nic frustration is a function of descripancy between 
present social aspiration and exr>ecta tions on the one hand, 
and social achicvenents on the other. Present estirrates (i.e. 
expectations of future frustrations or satisfactions) deternine 
the level of present frustration or satisfaction. Uncertainty 
in social er.pectations (i.e. v-hether the future vtilj bring 
disaster or salvation] increases the sense of systemic 
frustra tion. 
On the basis of th^ above hypothesis, Clinoton ^ink 
has given socio!onicrl, ser'^nticict and socio-pruchologicil 
27 
apriroarhas to 'social con flict; 
27. Fink, rungto* F. "Difficulties in the theoni ofconflict". 
Journal o~ conflict ^c' olvtion, Dccrr^her, 1960, p. 428. 
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the individual 
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Prf'judiae, hosti-
lity, hatred., 
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hetviQon the goal 
a ins or values 
of the opposing 
systems (indivi-
duals or groups); 
often rational. 
Hatred and 
Hostility does 
not necessarily 
present. 
Verbal or 
conceptual 
misunderstan-
ding between 
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non-rational; 
goal or value 
inco^patibility 
docs not exist. 
Hatred and 
''''OS til ity 
present. 
3, Modes 
of action 
Scaregoating, 
aggression, 
fighting, 
quarrel'ing, 
violcnrr; effortr 
to chorine atti-
tudes 0rmotives. 
Schism, secession, ^rcI-do"m in 
civil war, sect con^unica-
formation,splinter tion ef'^orts 
parties, resistance at semantic 
mov'-rnntr, revoJu- clari fica-
tions, strategic tion. 
considerations. 
A sinilar node! is nrovosed by Tad Bobert Gurr, and 
acbording to this, the notential fo^' collective violence is in 
direct proportion to th^ int^nsifii and scope of relative 
deprivation, lohich, in turn, detnrnines the nomative and utili-
tarian Justification for violence. 'Normative lustif^r"^'dons for 
violence are also deterr^ined ';" the historicnl -magnitude and the 
success 0'' acrJier rrn ! ^r^ in r>' -^nating ihc social d^nrivafionr. 
28, Gurr, Ted Robert, '^hu :'en Rebel . v, 326. 
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Utilitarian justificaiig^xMlfe also deter^^ined by new, 
symbolic appeals prescribing violence as an effective 
value opportunity for increasing value positions. These 
symbolic appeals offer plausible explanations of the 
sources of social deprivations, identifying taraets for 
violence, and provide simhols of group identification. 
.'^ost such appeals have both util itarian and effective 
content. Successful violence increases the likelihood 
of its recurrence, which is even r>ore increased in the 
presence of extra-punitiveness of socialisation prictices 
in a society. Under these socio-historical voriobles, if 
there is inadequate regime response, the regime legitimacy 
comes into question, increasing the potential for violence. 
There are three social structure situations lohich 
might produce s^iste^iatic frustration : one is conceived 
by James Davies and two by '^eierabend, Davies presumes a 
society which v^ay have enjoyed an all along improvement in 
socio-econo'~'ic-political fields and. expecting conditiors 
to further improve, but suddenly f-'ere r^av be a sharp 
reversal in these trends. Social discontent and turmoil 
to be felt b'l suc?i a societu is demonstrated by Davies in 
the form of "J-Curve" in a graphic fashion. Feierabend, 
29 however, conceives of tvo •n.ore J-Curves, 
29, Feierabend, Leo 'i Rosalind, "The comparative study of 
Revolution and violence", in Comparative Politics, 
(April 197^), p. 406-407, 
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SociaJ_Expectation 
Social Achievement 
Low Time 
^igh 
Low Time 
Uncertain SociQj Cond/tons 
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Figure 1 conceives of a country experiencing a meagre 
level of social ac' i ''"> 'rent and a low level of socio-ecqnonic-
political conditions for sometime and viith no hopes for 
improvement* There may he a sudden and unexpected improvenent 
and this social shock is sure to augment unrealistic expectations 
which will, undoubtedly, be disappointed giving rise to 
discontent and systematic frustration. Figure 2 depicts a 
society in a state of flux and disarray, changing ravidly in 
various directions, and vith an inconsistent and haphazard 
performance. Uncertainty of social security will result in 
social anxiet'i, a situation characteristic of systemic 
frustration. 
In the other theory of etiology of violence, Samuel 
30 Huntington argues that the cause of violence in the developing 
societies are to be found in the "Lag" between the dnveloprant 
of viable political institution and the processes of social 
and economic change. 
Violence is mostly a product of societal deprivation, 
or retarted enotio'ial development due to social handicaps, 
a product of the environment of the establishment. Social 
modernisation leads to centralisation of power and profit, 
creating inequalities of standards and expectations, and making 
life of some men I'^ore "nastu, brutish, and short", ^^nder this 
modernisation nrocess a nation as such does not develop but 
30, Huntington, Samuel P. Pol itical prefer in changing 
Societies , pp. ?9-^0, 
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Only certain section^'^J^0^^iUps, creatinn islands of 
prosperity in oceans oft^^^elopment. Thir process 
is actually maldevelojynent^ creatinn social tensions 
and increasinp the scope for violence. Under nrldeve-
lopnent violence lies not so nuch in the use o'" 'ho gun 
but in what the gun protects. Since the nun protects 
social exploitation and perpetuates d.enrivation, violence 
in' the developinp countries becomes the only means avai-
lable to remove the "ouaht and is dichotom.y". Violence 
is thus, a product of the system that a developinp 
society upholds. 
This process is almost natural for the developing 
societies. The rul-inn elite in such societies have to 
satisfy the expectations of modcrni^^ation besides keeping 
themselves in T>or;er, but their limited resources create a 
gap between f^^se expectations and. requisite results. 
In an at'e^pt to hoodioink the masses so that theu may 
fornet this aap, political participation is widely 
expanded and cultural - racial - communal - caste cleavanes 
are politicised. T'^is leads to an inflation of de~^ands bh 
groups vho su-^nort the governm.ent. A conflict sets in 
betv'een the incv bents and the aspirants. In such circnmr-
tances, Zol^-'crn helieves that pov^er aspirants d/^mnd pov'er 
not as an intrinsic value but as a value capacitu. It may 
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be pointed out that, in India also, the •'^carcit'' of 
resources was most acutely felt after independence, 
not because there was greater poverty than had been 
fifty years before, but because, popular aspirat i ons 
had expanded nuch nore rn^^idly than society's o.h1lity 
to fulfil public demands. 
Ihintinaton accepts the three tier paradigm of 
societies as developed by the structuralist-functionalist 
(i,e, traditional, transitional and modern). Hn.ntington 
argues that vhile the "irst and the last are less prone 
to violence and instahility, the transitional societies 
are the most prone. According to him, revolutionary 
upheavlas, nilitary coups, insurrections, guerrilla 
warfare, assassinations etc. are a comnon feature of 
transitional societies, Huntington rejects the "poverty 
thesis" that there is an irrefutable relationship betv>e^n 
violence and economic backwardness. 
Iluntin'gton postulates thnt it is not poverty and 
backwardness hui desire to get rich and. modernired that 
breeds instahilitv and violence: "if poor countries appear 
to be unstahi n^ a is not because the]' arc poor but because 
they are tming to be rich. A purely traditional society 
^'lould be ignorant, poor, rn-^ 'Stable. It is precisely 
devolution of 7ioder-->i.'raiion through^ovt ihe rcrld. mhich 
Increases thr vrevala.ice of violence around the viorld. 
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Causes of violence lay vnth the modernisation rather 
than with the backwardness". 
Hunt inn ton asserts that within modernisinn 
countries, violence, unrest and extre'nsn are found in 
the wealthier parts of the country rather than in poorer 
sections, (for India, v)e nay give the ''relevant examples 
from, the case of Punjab), Some degree of economic growth 
is, thus, necessary to make instability possible: "the 
poverty thesis falls down because the people roho are 
really poor are too poor for politics and too poor for 
protest. They are indifferent, apathetic, and lack 
exposure to the media and other stimuli which arouse their 
aspirations in such manner as tq galvanise them, into poli-
tical activity. Those vjho are concerned about the imj ediate 
goal of the next meal are not apt to worry about the grand 
transformation of society. Just as social mobilisation is 
is necessary to provide the motive for instability so also 
some measure o^ economic development is necessary to 
32 
provide the means for insta'bility". 
In this way, social iiobilisation is much more 
destabilising, than economic development. Urbanization, 
literacy, education, amass viedia, expose the traditional 
man to new forms of life and new possibilities of satis-
faction. These break the attitudinal barriers of the 
31, Huntinnton, SamuelP.Opp. cit, p. 41. 
32. Ibid, p. 52-3 
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traditional cultur'^ and promote new levels of csvirations. 
However, the capacity o^ a traditional soceity to satir.fv 
these aspirations increases nuch more slowly, Consenuently,, 
a gap or a "lag" develops hetiocpn aspirations and exvec-
tations. This lag generates social dissatisfaction vjhich 
leads to de">ands on government and. a greater participation 
to enforce these demands. Lack of adeouate political 
institutions- r^ake it difficult for the demands to be 
moderated or to he expressed through legitimate channels. 
Hence, the sharp increase in political participation leads 
to political instability and violence. 
The structural-rfunctionalist - behavioralist 
thinkers like Litcian Pyc, Edward Shils-^^, Clifford 
55 36 
Geerts,' and Jamp.s Coleman have called attention to 
the prevalance of violence in the "transitional societies". 
Their main argument is that the basic cause of internal 
violence is the lack o " political integration due to 
ethnic, regional, linguistic or communal splits and 
divisions. Since change ^reduces m.ore insecurity, there 
must be a quantitative increase in the degree of hostility 
rnthin socictu. 
33. Pye, Lucian. Aspects of Po''itical Development . 
34. Shi Is, Tdward. Political Pcvelopmont in the Jlev States 
35. Geert", Clifford. Old Societies and Nev States -• 
The Quest for ."odernitji in Asia and Africa , 
36. Coleman, Janrs. The politics of -'he Develoninq Areas , 
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Bienen has given an interestina explanation of this 
phenor^enon: **as pronle are being chan.nec' fro-^ traditional 
into moderns their sensitivity to heinr changed 
is a source of violence in traditional societies since 
change profuces lore insecurity, there nust he a nvantita-
tive increase in the degree of agression and hostility 
within society the highest and loicest noints of 
modernity continuum' loill tend to produce naximum stability 
in the political order, vihereas a nedium position on the 
continuum will produce maximum instability there is 
a connection between rates of change, 'he breaking up of 
37 traditional societies and increased violence. 
It is necessary to emvhasise that violence is not 
necessarily the bi-product of developmental process, 
per se» The fact is that it is not development hut 'he 
disequilibrium in dnvr]o-^-^^^ni, or r^hat may he better 
described as nal''eveloprient, that results in tensions, 
con flicts and violence. The developmental task, vith 
social Justzre and re'r.ovrl of poverty, becomes difficult 
in a situation, o^ scarce resources or less than optional 
tapping o^ recources, couple" vith loiv production, in-
adequate or obsolete technology but ever increase in demands 
by steadity groT'ing population v)hich has ^•>ecome nevily 
37* Bienen, Henry, Violence and Social change 
(Ohicago : 1968), pp. 48,51 & 52. 
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conscious o^ its political rights. In an unequal 
soceitpt fragmented by tribal, caste, class, communal 
or other cleavages, the naldevelopment process resulting 
in unegual opportunities in the competition for Jobs, 
educational and social services facilities etc, angrevate 
group and class conflict on the one hand, and accentuate 
individual frustration on the other. 
The link between economic inequality and '^ jlitical 
violence has been enphasised by political thinJ' rs of all 
the ages: "Aristotle considered inenuality to he the 
universal and chief cause of revolutions, contending in 
The JPol ttics that inferiors revolt in order that they nav 
be equal, and ennals that they may he superiors. Centuries 
later ^'edison in The Federalist -• //o. 10, characterised 
inequality in the distribution of property as the most 
connon and durable source of political friction. Still 
later, Enaels argued that political violence results V'hen 
political structures are not synchronised with socio-economic 
•TO 
conditions, " WJiile testing these hypothesis in diverse 
and varied soria^ sottinns, the above authors state that 
1 
''we have hrovght theoretical agreement that economic 
39 
enequality begets political violence," 
38, Sigelnan, Lec.anrJ Sirpeon, "iles. "Cross-^^afzonal Test 
of the Linkaoe Petvieen Economic Tnequr' T ity and Poli-
tical Violence", The Journal of conflict ^c-olution, 
March, 1977, pp. 105-128, 
59, Ibid, p, 103. 
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Scononic interes^ts - disputes get politicised, 
resulting in tensions, conflicts and violence. Inter-
group disputes acquire thn fnrm of inter ethnic, inter-
communal, inter-caste, inter-linaual and inter-cultural 
cojifl icts. 
We may conclude that shortconings in the performance 
of the political-economic sj/sten together with acute poverty, 
chronic inequality and elite repression constitute major 
causes of political violence in the developing countires of 
the Third J7orld, 
CHAPTER - IV 
,''NAT UBS OF VIOLENCE" 
It would he appropriate that, in asserting the nature 
of violence, we do not have to give an authoritative statement 
of what violence is, but what it involves. This would provide 
a basis for further assessment* 
Hannah Arendt points out the consequences when the 
'notions drawn from areas of productivity invade the understanding 
of control and authority. 
An element of violence is inevitably inherent in all 
activities of making, fabricating, and producing, that is, in 
all activities by which men confront nature directly, as distin-
guished from those activities, like action and speech, which Are 
primarily directed toward human being. This building of the 
human artifice always involves some violence done to nature -
we must kill a tree in order to have lumber, and we must violate 
•J 
this nartial in order to build a table, 
MormS about nature of violence defend upon how we deal -
with aggressive impulses and how we deal v)ith it defends upon 
our cultural traditions of civil peace or conflict. If social 
deprivation is shared, the responsibility for it is also shaded 
and political targets do not become the immediate casualty. 
1, Hannah, Arendt. "What was Authority"? in Authority, ed, by C.J. 
Friedrich. Cambridge, ^ass, 1958, p, 91, 
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But, in cases of specific deprivation, discontent deflects 
responsibility on the political targets, and scope for 
2 
violence increases. Intensely discontented populations 
become, susceptible to beliefs Justifying the righteousness 
of violence, calculating about the gains (real or imaginary) 
tkey can achieve through violence. When prejudice or 
hostility has developed, the report of any additional grievance 
activities norms Justifying violence. These hostile attitudes 
along lines of political, religious, or class cleavages 
originate in a variety of ways: from a history of group 
conflict, from threatening demands^ of a subordinate group 
for additional privileges or simply from increased contacts 
between people belonging to different ideational system and 
life styles,^ Once the hostile attitudes have developed, 
impulse to violent action is determined by beliefs about the 
sources of deprivation and about the normative utilitarian 
and socio-cultural Justifiability of violent action directed 
against the source of deprivation. 
According to Wolfgang, "me find no psychological evidence 
of any spontaneous stimuli for fighting arising within the body 
of a normal organism. This lack- of evidence leads to an 
important consideration: the chain of causation of overt 
2. Gurr, Ted Robert, Why Men Rebel , p. 193. 
3. Leonard, Berkowits discusses this in detail in chapter 
VI of Aggression: A S^ocial Psychological Analysis. 
4. Gurr, Ted Robert, opp cit, p. 197. 
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aggression traces back to the outside of the organism, and 
although there may be individual differences in the reactivity 
to external stimuli evoking aggression, these inner character-
istics do not, by themselves explain aggressive behnvior. 
Violence is not a necessary manifestat'on of huran 
nature. Neither it is a necessary consequence of the existence 
political society. It is --merely a specific response to specific 
social conditions. Hotiva^ion for violence may not necessarily 
be instinctive because only activity to reach the goal is 
instinctual, not the goal itself. Therefore, it is the capacity 
for violence, not the need, which apvears to be bioloqically 
inherent in men. The need for violence depends on how badly 
socially derived expectations are violated. In this way, 
discontent becomes the need for violence, when pedle believe 
that violence against the source of discontent is justified in 
a normative sense. 
The normal resvonse of the majority in any society is 
obedience to authoritxi, whether it is from habit, fear,apathy, 
self interest or identification with its goals. Violence is a 
real and serious challenge to the norm of this conforming 
behavior and first has to defy a ground on which such norms 
rest. Justification for violence has to be within the framework 
5, Wolfgang, S, 'farvine. "A preface to violence", in The Annals 
of the American Acadevui of Folitical & Social Science. Haxch 1%t 
6, Ibid p. T17. 
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of the basic values shared in a society. If, in a 
political.struggle, it seems that, to secure redress, a 
real threat to the stability o^ an apathetic society is 
needed, violence is more likely to be adopted even at the 
risk of repression. 
Violence is not erratic and meaningless, hut is a 
7 
natural form of poliiiccl ben-vior. Individuals- resort 
to violence, not because they are incapable of other -^odes 
of behavior, but because the^' consciously believe that 
their behavior is the most rational may of achievirg parti-
cular goals. Violence is often emploi/ed by unreasorable men, 
but never without reason. When people believe that conditions 
could be changed but are not, violence becomes a natural human 
emotion. This emotionalism' is not inconsistent loith the 
capacity to rationally determine any action or specifically 
select specific node for achieving the desired goals. Violence, 
in fact, may be looked u^or. as society's early warning system, 
revealing deep rooted conflicts gathering strength beneath the 
surface of social relations. It is a form of communication, 
a method of getting a message across that the government is not' 
getting the consensus of its citizens on matters lohich touch 
them deeply. It is an indication that pressure had been building 
up against the chain of social relationship. 
7. Neiberg,. H.-L. '^Political Violence: The Behavioral 
Process, " p.81 
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Two rational aspects may be given for violence-' 
Its actual use and its threatened or potential use. These 
two aspects can not be separated. In the abse''>ce of 
capability of the actual use, the threat of violence loill 
have little effect in indvcinp a willingness to hcrgain 
politically. Actually, threat of violence intends not the 
provocation of actual violence but an acco^^Todoi ion of 
interests, Sinilarl'', the actual use of violence intends 
to demonstrate the will an^'^ capability of act'on, to establish 
sone credibilit]' of future thre'ts. 
In the social bargaining snectrum, violence is a 
technique in the sence, that, as a potent'al threat, it 
changes the bargaining equation. In a sense, as NeibeP'^ 
sa^is, it is the ultimate test of viability of values and 
q 
custo^iary behavior. Violence has become a nornal and 
accepted met\od of political b^rgai^^ing, change and control. 
Anu social STStem may erupt into violence if an imr^ortant 
social group finds its vital interests denied v)hen pursued 
through conventional legal channels. The use of violence 
is a continuation of bargaining begun by other means, Neiberg 
has aptly described this process in these loords: " All the 
attenuated politically socialised forms of indirect povjer 
are brushed aside. The throat of force becomes action. 
8, lleiberg, H.L, "The threat of violence and social change," 
American Political Science neview,__ December 19^2, p. 865. 
9, r^iberg, ILL. Political violence: The Behavioral 
Process, p. 9, 
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inching from forms of demonstration and continued hargaining 
into a direct test of relative por'wr bv actual mutual attack 
and defence. Bargaining, inducement, coercion and Tiossible 
accommodation novi hang upon tnctical and strategic weakness 
and advantage, the shifting conditions o f maneuver and 
battle. Yet, sJiort of the total collapse or destruction of 
the means of struggle on one side, the element of bargaining, 
the continuous assessment of canabilities, risks and costs is 
not suspended in the movement toioards eventual accommodation. 
Power in the sense of raw violence, defence and counter 
violence is always in- the process of measurement, vihich at 
some point of respite becomets the provisional basis for 
10 political settlement* 
Violence is not political pathology but a particular 
mode of political participation, chosen by those who feel 
that the system can, and must be^ pushed into action. It 
represents bargaining for articulate community values, denied 
to a section of the community. It is also clear that violence 
is increasingly becoming political, programmed, sfanderdised 
in terms of techniq-ues and becoming closely corelated with 
the organisational capacities of groups which sponsor it. 
In this sense, we may say that violence has become a convent-
ional form of political participation. Potential for violence 
is reduced if there are freedoms to redress grievances and 
10, Ibid, p,12. 
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if legal channels are available to remove discontent 
because riots are the language of those to whom no one 
listens. In stable conditiopSy social changes are carried 
through legal channels. But in unstable conditions, 
bargaining for social values is sonetines intensi^ied to 
the point of violence, because I'egiti-nacy of the political 
system will always rencin questionable to- those to w'-^on 
resources are not available. 
An environment of acute economic deprivation has 
discouraging effects unon those who apnear as having the 
biggest reasons to revolt against. Violence being a 
rational technique, there must be some degree of the hope 
of success before it can be resorted to. An extreme 
inequality in itself does not appear to promote svch hope-
fullness. The poorest in a society can do little hej'ond 
ensuring that they remain above the starvation level. It is 
only those who have some material resources to spare, but 
are dissatisfied with_ what they have, that are more likely 
to risk an open defiance of the authority, which might lead 
to violence. 
It is, thus, claimed that the use of violence is to 
be viewed as a reflection of basic values that stand apart 
from the dominant, central or parent culture. 
In their assessment of the impact of industrialisation 
on social siabilitu, Clark Kerr etc. point out: " The discontent 
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of workers, reflected in the disruptive forms of protest, 
tends to be greatest in the early stages of industrialization 
and tends to decline as workers become accustomed to industri-
alization. The partially committed industrial worker, with 
strong ties to the extended family and village, unaccustomed 
to urban life and to the siscipline and ways of the factory, 
is more likely to reflect uvon revolt against industrial life 
than the seasoned worker, more familiar with the VWAJS o-f the 
factory, more understa'^ding of the reasons for the web of 
factory rules, more reconciled to factory life. The workers, 
in the process of the early stages of industrialisation, is 
more prone to prolonged and sporadic withdrawal from industrial 
work, wildcat stoppages, naked violence, and destruction of 
11 
machines and property". 
This would suggest that violence should increase across 
societies from, low to middle ranges of economic development 
but then decline at the highest levels thereby reflecting 
the stalkising effect of post industrial affluence. 
On the other hand, Sorokin suggests that violence is a 
phenomenon of societies with rapid transformation: "The hypo-
thesis of transition accounts for these tidal waves of disturb-
ance. It means that, other conditions being equal, during 
the periods when existing culture, or the system of social 
relationships, or both, undergo a rapid transformation, the 
11, Kerr, Clark et, al,. Industrialism and Industrial Man, 
( Mass: fpSO > p .50. 
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internal disturbances in the respective societies increase. 
The main and ,indispensable condition for an eruption of 
internal disturbances is that the social system or cultural 
system or both be unsettled. This seems to fit the facts 
much better than most of the popular theories that ascribe 
internal disturbances either to growing poverty and the hard 
12 material conditions, or, on the contraru, to material progress'.' 
Similar to the above observation of Sorokin, are the 
points mad'e by Mancur Olson that rapid economic change, whether 
upswing or downswing, frequently produces severe social 
instability, conflict and the potential for revolution: contrary 
to the common nation that economic growth promotes political 
stability and even stable democracy, it produces severe social 
dislocations, loosening the caste and class ties that bind men 
to the existina social order; those separated in the historical 
process of rapid economic growth from their villages and 
extended families are not apt to acquire comparable social 
connections in the city and thus are prone to Join dQstabiliBing 
mass movements. Further more, economic growth frequently 
increases the number of social 'losers', since although' the 
national product increases, it often becomes concentrated in 
fewer hands so that large segments of society experience a net 
loss in economic well-being. 
12, Sorokin, Pitrim A, Social and Cultural Dynamics, 
(Boston; 1957) p. 602, 
13, Olsdn, Mancur. '*Rapid Growth as a Destabilising Force," 
Journal of Economic History^ December 1963, pp 529-552, 
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Likewise, a ravid decrease in the level of economic 
develovment of a society can produce si'^ilar destabiliri g 
effects. This is true because such a decrease usually 
involves changes in the relative econonic positions of large 
» 
numbers of peor^le, thus setting up contradictions hetvieen 
the structure o •^  econonic porter and the distribution of social 
and political rjoner, Kornhauser viewed major discontinviti'^s 
in the social vrocessy as indexed by the rates, scope and mode 
of social change, as the principal cause of mass society and 
political violence. The social distruption that accompa -ies 
rapid urbanisation and industrialisation is destabilising 
because it uproots and atomises large numbers of peovle by 
vitiating or entirely destroying intermediate organisations 
and institutions that align them with the large society. 
According to Huntington, socio-economic chanaes necess-
arily disrupt traditional, social and political groupings and 
undermine royalty to traditional authorities, A broader form 
of social organisation is replaced by a narrower one and the 
hostilities intesified. Modernisation tends to produce 
alienation, anomie, normlessness generated by the conflict 
of old values and new. It means that groups become increasingly 
aware of themselves as groups and of their interests and claims 
in relation to other grouvs. Alongwith group consciousness, 
group prejudice also develops when there is intensive contact 
14, Kornhauser, William, The Politics of Mass Society, 
(New York: 1959) p. 37, 
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between different groups and alongwith group prejudice, 
comes group conflict. Ethnic or religious groups which 
had lived peacefully side by side in trrditional societies 
become aroused to violent conflict. As a result of the 
interaction, the tensions and inequalities are generated 
15 by social and economic modernisation. 
Huntington also suggests that it is not the absence 
of moddrnisation but efforts to achieve it which produce 
political disorders, conflicts, and violence: " If poor 
countries appear to be unstable, it is not because then are 
poor, but because they are trying to become rich. A purely 
traditional society would be ignorant, poor and stable." 
This hypothesis also holds for variations vithin 
countries. In modernising countries violence, unrest, and 
extremism are more often found in the p>eal their narts of the 
country than in the poorer sections. In anal'/sing the Indian 
situation, ^oselits and Reiner found that the corelation 
between political stabiliti/ and economic developr^ent is poor 
17 or even negative. 
Modernization,promotes new levels of aspirations and 
wants, but the ability of a transitional society to satisfy 
these new aspirations increases much more slowly than the 
15* Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing 
Societies. p. 39* 
16. Ibid p. 41. 
17. Hoselits, Bert F., and :'yron Reiner, "Economic development 
and political stability in India," Dissent, 
spring 1961, v. 173, 
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aspirations themselves. Consequently a gap develops between 
aspiration and expectations, want formation and want satis-
faction: Political instability in modernising countries is 
in large part a function of the. gap between aspiration anr' 
expectations produced by the escalation of aspirations which 
particularly occurs in the early phases of modernisation." 
This implies that the scone for violence increases 
when economic expectations, resnJ ting from economic imnrovement, 
are thv^arted by econonic adversity and 'inability of the socio-
political system to take remedicfl act-'on. The suffering which 
is undertaken patiently as inevitable seems unbearable as soon 
as the idea of escaping from it is conceived, I^en lohose economic 
lot is improving aspire for greater political particivationtand 
vice-versa failing lohich they become more susceptihle to 
violence. Galtung prc^oses -"hat any aggression, even crime, 
rebellion or war, is caused by "rank disequilibria," that is 
a lack of consistensive in the ranking of individuals, groups 
79 
or Nations, on whatever value hierarchies are relevant to them. 
It means value expectations of a group for higher status are 
increased in case of an increase in its share of welfare values^ 
If a group has attained q high rank in a social distribution of 
one value, it will expect a corresponding rank on other values 
also. If its status attributes are differently ranked on the 
18. Huntington. 0pp. cit p,56. 
19* Galtung, John, ^A structural theory of Aggression, " 
Journal of Peace Research, Ho,2 of 1964, p,95. 
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social hierarchyf the group will be dissatisfied and prone 
to violence. 
The above analysis suanests that intensely discontented 
men are disposed to aggression. Here, the assertion is that 
participants in violence have utilitarian motives: They 
believe that they have a chance of relieving so'^.e of their 
discontent through violence. This percer^tion of vAil itv is 
not alvmys rational in the sense of being hased on accurate 
calculations about the effects of alternative forces of action. 
Men are said to have uti- itarian motives about po^ itical 
violence to the extent that they believe violent action vnll 
inprove overall value positions. '^en Tv.ake, more or less, 
explicit calculations about the prospective benefits vis a vis 
prospecttves costs of violence as a tactic. Such calculation's 
are likely to be ^.ore explicit among leaders, more implicit 
among potential follon^ers the greater they believe the 
potential gains to be, the more Justifiable violc'ce is likely 
to appear' to them. 
The utiJ itarian functions nttrib^'ted to violence m.ai/ 
differ dim.ensionallii. Violence ma'/ be regarded as a direct 
tactic of value enhancem.ent, out there may he a difference of 
emphasis betv^een the dem.onstrative threats of violence and the 
actual use of violence. In the utilitarian sense, the m.ost 
direct use of violence is to seise a desired object. Less 
direct use of violence includes protests, strikes, and anti-
government riots vihich are designed to force the governm.ent to 
65 
change iindesireahle policies. In the former kin<^s of events 
the threat of violence is ^ore potent than the actuality; in 
the latter, violence itself is required. An indirect use of 
violence may symbolically demonstrate the demands of those 
mho use it and their capacit^i to disrupt society i^ their 
demands are not satisfied, "This kind of tactical use and 
threatened use of political violence is characteristic of 
participants and leaders perceive a potential form alleviating 
deprivation vnthin the existinn political svstem, ^ut if 
dissidents believe that their objectives can be obtained only 
by transforminq the system, they are likely to use terroristic 
tactics to publicise their existence and objectives, and to 
widen popular support by providing symbolic models for aggre-
ssion and by demonstrating the regime's incapacity to provide 
protection, hoping ultimately to overthrow it, Krogotkin, 
an ardent advocate of terrorisr>, emphasised the conversion 
effect of such acts,"through the terrorist deeds which attract 
general attention, the nevj idea insinuates itself into people's 
heads and makes converts. Such an act does more propagandis i ^r 
21 
in a fev days than do thousands of pamphalets," 
Revolutionary appeals persuade men that political 
violence can provide value gains equal to or greater than its 
costs in risk and rv.ilt, Gitrr epphasises that revolutionarv 
20. Gurr, Ted Robert, "/i;/ :[en Rebel , p. 212, 
fed.) 
21, Kropotkin, Pierre, ojioter' in Eckstein, Harri/./Internal war : 
Problems and Anvroaches, p. 5.5. 
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appeals "provide justi ^cation for nem or intensi ried value 
expectations, and enhance 'len's value capahilities by 
specifying apryropriate kivds o' actions (value OT)r>ortu7T.itir'S) 
no 
Which make it possible to attain those value expectations. " 
The. factor which deternines the perceived utiTiiy of 
violence is people's previous success in attainirn their evds by 
such means. People vho obtain their de'^ands throuah aggression 
are likely to use it as a tactic in the future, Bevmrds for 
aggression establish persistent annressive habits. Similarl^^, 
if men believe that violence i " their predecessors succeeded, 
they vill be disposed to use it ^hemselves in similar circums-
tances. This may explain the rec-urrence of more than hundred 
cup d' etat in Latin American countries in the first seventy 
five years of the 20th century. 
Similarly, violence may attain a utilitarian perspec-
tive by the demonstration e'^^ect o •'' other groups' success fi 1 use 
or threat of violence. People v^ho observe others gain sdtis-
faction through aggression are likely to emMlate them. Such 
effect Kould be even greater if the perceiving group seize 
substantial comvarahility betioeen its status and that of the 
group it might emulate. 
22, Gurr, Ted Robert Ovp,cit, p. 216. 
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Much of the utilitarian content of violence involves 
some sort of scapegoating. People become ecsilu susceptible to 
beliefs that identify eth&nic, religious, political or tribal 
minorities as sources of deprivation, hence as Justifiable 
targets of attack. Violent anti-Jeio policies of Ua-'^i Germany 
were carried out in this fashion, ^hen Hitler vms asked vkether 
he thought that the Jew had to be destroyed, he is reported to 
have said, "no, we should have then to invent him, it is essen-
25 tial to have a tangible enemy not merely an abstract one. " 
Hitler used anti-semitisn to achieve an ideological reconcilia-
tion of basically contradictory appeals. He satisfied the German 
middle class that there v^ould be no labour trouble after thr 
elimination of the Jewish agitators, and at the sane tine could 
hoodwink the workers that their economic difficulties would be 
removed when Jewish capitalists were exteriminated. Thus, 
Hitler employed anti-semitic violence primarily for pdlitical 
ends, because expression of these hostile attitudes made it 
possible for the Uasis to say other things that attract people. 
Inter-nroup violence mostly results due to displacement of 
aggression fron other objects. A number of factors influence the 
s 
effectiveness of beliefs justifying scapegoating. One is the 
previous'association of the out group with hostility, for example 
as a source of post frustrations or as previous targe-i'S of aggre-
ssion. If men already dislike an outgroup for sons reasons, they 
23, Hof^er, ^ric. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature 
of :fass ''overent~. (Harper : 1951), p. 90'. 
- 68 -
are susceptible to rumours and beliefs that associate their 
present discontent witk a group. Also the visibility of 
out-groups determines their scapegoatin.n. The more visible 
or different they are, the more readily discontented people 
learn external and internal cues that associate such groups 
with their disconten i. f / e more de ^en^eless an outproup 
appears to be, the more rcadili/ is blame attributed ' to it and 
25 
aggression directed against it. 
26 
Violence is political yihen, "used to control or 
influence collective policies or the distribution of porter",' 
It refers to all "collective attacks roithin a political comrunity 
against the political repi^^c, its actors - including competinc 
27 political groups as well as incw'bents - or its policies. "^ 
It is the effect sought (or achieved) that .distinguishes poli-
tical from non-political violence, not the causes from, lohich 
either sprtngs. Violence is political, if it results (or ic 
expected to result) in a change in the constitution, rulers or 
policies viithin a pol iticr.l ordpn'' Political violence is a 
mode of participation hy those mho believe that the politiccl 
system can, and. must he; hurric'"'' or pushed into action. In short, 
we can say that political violence means an attem.pt to bring 
changes .in the political order through violence. 
24. Berkoioits, Leonard, Ag -recs ion : A social Psj/chological 
Analysis, pp. 152-160. 
25J. Walter, Richard, "Implications o " laboratory stvjHes of 
Aggression for t^^p control and Rcgvlation of violence". Annals 
of the American Academ.ii o " Political and Social Science. 
:farch 1966, pp. 69-70. 
26. Haag, Ernes f van den ^Political Violence and ^ivil DisohMJ^MS 
p. 80. 
27. Guur, Ted J^obert. 0pp. cit. p. 4. 
28. Eckstein, Harry On the etiology of Internal ^ars, p, 133* 
*-«5 i^i 
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Some factors can he formulated that deternine the 
political nature of violence: 
(i) Object of vie tin (toward who? the hehrvi^vr 
is directed), 
(a) Implementation (the loay the act is carried out), 
(iii) .'fotivation (impulsive or calculated), 
(iv) Association (Lone act or conspiratorial group), 
(v) Organisation of the activity (Professional 
assassins or individuals induced by pressure 
of others), 
(vi) Culture pattern (Perc^vtion of normative pattern 
of political behavioj'}, and 
(vii) Political impact and effects. 
With these variables, political violence would mean, 
"acts of disruption, destruction, injury, whose purpose, choice 
of targets, or victims sorroundinp circumstances, implenentafion 
and/or effects have political significance which tend to modify 
the behavior of oth&rs in a bargaining position thrt has conse-
quences for 'he social system. '^ The purpose of political 
violence may be categorised by reference to whether it is "direc-
ted towards securing changes in the operation of the law or 
policy of the government, the law or policy itself, the change 
of government, an alteration of the Dolitical systen or a 
transformation of the society. 
29. Neiberg H,L. Political Violence : The Behavioral Process . 
p, T^. 
30. Ifacfarlane, Las lie. Political Disobedience . p. 37. 
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At a general level of analysis, political violence 
is a homogeneous universe v^ithin which forns of violence are 
as follows:-'^ 
/. Turmoil 
2, Conspiracy 
5. Internal 
Relatively spontaneous, unorganised 
political violence vith su stantial 
vopular participation, including 
violent political strikes, riots, 
political clashes, and localised 
rebellions. 
Highly organised political violence with 
limited participation, including orga-
nised political assassinations, small-
scale terorism, small-scale guerrilla wars, 
coujj d' etat, and mutinies. 
Highly organised political violence with 
wide spread popular participation, desi-
gned to overthrow the repine or dissolve 
the state and accompanied by extensive 
violence, including large-scale terrorism 
and guerrilla wars, civil wars, & 
revolu-tions. 
The quality which is common to all the above forms and , 
is a characteristic of its political nature, is that violence 
is used to acquire, extend or retain power or authority. 
The legiiimacy of the political system remains question-
able to social groups if their interests are not accommodated 
31, Gurr, Ted Robert. Onp cit p. 11. 
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and compT*oui$ed, Such groups may resort to force and . 
violence for making demands upon the political system. 
it Reception of deprivation induces'discontent which is the 
instigating condition for violence. Whatever the theoretical 
notions about the causes of violence (such as frustration, 
alienation, drive goal conflicts, exigency, strain etc.) 
the linkage between deprivation and discontent is implicit 
or explicit in all of then. 
The casual se'^uence in nolitical violence is, -^irst, 
the absence o^ acco-'-^odatio-^. of interests of some groups; 
second, the development o •" discontent; third, the politici-
sation of that discontent; 'ourth, its actualisation in 
violent action against political object and actors. There may 
be a belief that violence has utility in obtaining scr^ce 
values, and this may, in itself, become a source^ o ' violence. 
But generally, within political system, this feeling is more 
likely to provide only a secondary, but rationalising, 
motivation and not the prinnry cause. Whereas, vjide spread dis 
discontent provides a general impetus to political violence. 
Politicised discontent is " a necessary condition for the 
resort to violence of politics" if normative and utilitarian 
attitudes -'ocus that potential. 
The ""lere existence of discontent alone is not enour}> 
to Justify violence. Violence, resulting from deprivation 
32. Gurr, Ted Robert. Opp cit p . 74. 
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discontentf becomes politicised when peovle are mode avare 
4 
of deprivation. Discontented peonle can act aggressively 
anly when they become avare of the supposed source o^ 
frustration, or soneone or sonething v ith which then associate 
frustration. Schvmrtr^ examines the functions o f revolutionary 
33 appeals in this context: The target o/^  such appeals are 
passively alienated peonle mho perceive threat, futility and 
loss in their political environ ent and as a consequence 
harbour feeliigs of te sion and rage. Discontented peor^le 
are inherently disposed to doctrinal Justi fications of aggressive 
action. 
Political violence aims at creating naximum inconvenience 
to social order. This is a vay of influence for those who ore 
otherwise weak in other more nositive aspects of social harnainlng 
because "jjy'causing reallocation of the resources of the society 
into the essentially negative goal of internal secvrity, the 
opposition is in a r^osition to defeat or cripple the positive 
goals v)hose cccoviryl ishnent ^iaht legiti-iise and strengthen 
governmental auf-'orityS. 
If a policy is supported by the majority in a democracy,-
necessary policy changes can be brought about at the required 
tine. Similarly, if a democratic government is c^^iosed by the 
majority, it can be easily and legally ousted from its office, 
'^ut if a -'inority believes n change of noJ icy to be necessary, 
and iTpportant enough to imnos'^ it ' on the majority, either 
33* Schwartz, David C. ^A Theory of Revolutionary Behavior, 
in Janes C, Davies^^Then Men Rebel and Why, p,85, 
34* Keiberg, H, L, Opp cit p, 127, 
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without persuading the latter or after despairing of the 
attempts to persuade, then violence is not only needed but 
even justifiatle ^ to the ninorit ', Obviously, violence is 
required when its aims are not supported by the ^""njority and, 
therefore, " the cost of violence against a democratic 
government includes a cost of forcefully imposing noJicies 
not approved or opposed bn the nrjoritii'.' 
We have to accept it that in a democracy the majoriti/ 
« 
remains unpersuaded and has to be coerced. If sons lam or 
policy has to he changed, it can be brounht about onlj' by 
atter^pts to replace or over-throw the governr-^ent of the 
majority. Without this ascwvption, there can not be any 
case for violecnce in a democracy. 
35. Haag, Ernest Van den, Opv cit p. 76 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
It may be submitted that resort to violence does 
not occur without reason. Violence is a natural and 
logical form of political behaviour. Men resort to 
violence, not because they are incapable of other 
mofies of behaviour, but because they consciousljj believe 
that this particular behaviour is the most rational way of 
achieving particular goals quickly. Ami political system 
may erupt into violence if an imnortant social group finds 
its vital interests denied when pursued through conventional 
legal channels. It is because of this reason that violence 
has become a normal and accepted method of political bargai" 
ning, change and control. 
Violence is a technique for social bargaining, in the 
sense that, as a potential threat, it changes, in fact, the 
bargaining equation. Threat of violence, at the time of 
social bargaining, intends not the provocation of actual 
violence as-- such, but the accommodation of interests. It 
represents bargaining for articulate conmunity values denied 
to a section of the community and, thus, becomes a particular* • 
node of political participation for those who feel that the 
system can, and must, be pushed into action. In unstable social 
conditions, bargaining for scarce social values is sometimes 
intensified to the point of violence, because legitimacy of the 
political system remains ques tionable to those to whom resources 
- 75 -
are not available. Such discontented per^'^ons believe that 
violence against political si/stem or its actors is justified 
in a normative sense, and potentially useful in enhancing 
their prospects for scarce social values. Political system 
and its actors are naturally held responsibly, by errors of 
commission or onission, for depriving conditions and, them ^ore, 
focus against themse'.vn • the potential for politiccl violence. 
Deprivation, and resultant discontent, of values has 
always been identi''ied, in theoretical anal]ises,as the most 
general precondition for violence. If a discrepancy exists 
between what they have relative to vihat they think is Justly 
theirs, they feel devrived and discontented and become more 
prone to resort to violence to redress their deprivation. 
The deprived individual feels ivpelled to remedy, by whatever 
means are available, the material and psychic frustrations 
produced in him. 'Social violence is likely to occur in casps 
of competition for scarce social values, inhen accomodative 
nature of society loses its viability. Deprivation denotes 
the tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' 
4 
and 'is' o'" collective value satisfaction, disposing m.en to 
violence. 
.'fost o^ten, violence is the resu'^t of status 'Hscrepancy, 
that is, if men or groups are high on one dimension of social 
stratification but loi" on another, they are r^rone to violence 
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io attain equilibrated position on all dimensions. 'I'his 
phenomenon of status discrepancy is the characteristic feature 
of social mobilisation and maldevelopment. These are the 
conditions when clusters o^ old socio-economic and psychological 
comritments are eroded and people become available for new 
patterns of socialisution and behaviour, generating the new hinds 
of social corpetition and scarcity, underlying contemporary 
antagonisms. Under the modernisation process, a nation as such 
does not develop but only certain sections and groups, creating 
island's of prosperity in oceans o^ underdevelopment. This pro-
cess is, in fact, maldevelopment, creating social tensions and 
increasing the scope for violence. In under-developed societies, 
the political elite, in order t.o hoodwink the masses so that they 
may forget the status discrepancy, widely expand political parti-
cipation and politicise the socio-cultural, racial and communal 
cleavages, '^en enter into conflict not because they are diffe-
rent, but because -they are essentially the same. It is by making 
men more alike, in tkp sense of possesssing the same wants, that 
modernisation tends to promote conflict. 
Whether by default, or due to high expectations inherent 
in its welfare nature, the political system is -^ostlj/ held res-
ponsible for nearly all the social deprivations. At this stage, 
any group may regard t>c institutionalir.ed nrocedures for expre-
ssing grievances as ine F-^ective and inadeauate. This is the 
procers 0^ th^ transfornationo ^ private problems into public 
issues, in which private discontent is politicised and then 
publicly acted upon to secure its redress. 
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Conditions conducive to conflict and violent outhurat 
are there in present day socinties. Put violent outbursts do 
not always oc^^ur. Structural strain msultinc fron anxiety 
and frustration must be present in'social conflicts to induce 
violence. The idea of action must spread through th/^ nroup 
which shares the strain. Then, any dranatic event v^oulri 
precipitate action. Conflict hetwern expectation and possi-
bility is always latent, vhich cones into open in times of 
strain. Then, the result is violent, direct, action. 
Thus it nay be sumrzed 'hat man, by instinct, desires 
the attainment o-^ de-'ired values and objectives. Because of 
scarcity of social resources and values, it is not possible 
for every one to be satis fied. This leads to an inherent fear 
in each lest -^he other surpass hin in goal-attainrrf^nt, and this 
coflict is the result of a frustration, a deprivation of vnlv.es. 
Because of it, the nartier deride to destroy, subdue or drivn 
away +he opponent hy means of threats or actual violrnce. In this 
way, violence becomes a technique, a -tool, in the process of 
goal attainment. Since goal attainment is a political process 
(struggle for povier), violence is a political technique to 
achieve goals and values. 
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